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Abstract
Garbled circuits offer a powerful primitive for com-
putation on a user’s personal data while keeping that
data private. Despite recent improvements, constructing
and evaluating circuits of any useful size remains expen-
sive on the limited hardware resources of a smartphone,
the primary computational device available to most users
around the world. In this work, we develop a new tech-
nique for securely outsourcing the generation of garbled
circuits to a Cloud provider. By outsourcing the cir-
cuit generation, we are able to eliminate the most costly
operations from the mobile device, including oblivious
transfers. After proving the security of our techniques in
the malicious model, we experimentally demonstrate that
our new protocol, built on this role reversal, decreases
execution time by 98% and reduces network costs by as
much as 63% compared to previous outsourcing proto-
cols. In so doing, we demonstrate that the use of garbled
circuits on mobile devices can be made nearly as practi-
cal as it is becoming for server-class machines.
1 Introduction
Mobile devices have become one of the dominant com-
puting platforms, with approximately 57% market pen-
etration in the United States alone [6]. These devices
are capable of gathering and storing all of a user’s per-
sonal data, from current location and social contacts to
banking and electronic payment information. Because
of the personal nature of these devices, it is critical that
a user’s information be protected at all times. Unfortu-
nately, many smartphone applications that require users
to send data to application servers make preserving the
privacy of this data difficult.
To resolve this issue, a variety of secure multiparty
computation techniques exist that could be leveraged to
perform computation over encrypted inputs [24, 9, 8, 4].
Currently, the most practically efficient of these tech-
niques is the Yao Garbled Circuit [36]. Despite recent
improvements in the efficiency of garbled circuits [23,
34], this technique still requires significant computation
and communication resources, rendering it impractical
for most smartphones. One possible solution to this im-
balance of resources is to blindly outsource the heavy
computation to the Cloud. However, because of the un-
trusted nature of Cloud providers [35], such a solution
fails to provide measurable guarantees for applications
requiring high assurance.
In this work, we develop a new protocol for securely
outsourcing garbled circuit generation to an untrusted
Cloud. We construct a protocol that offloads the role of
generating the garbled circuit from the mobile device to
the Cloud without exposing any private inputs or outputs.
By choosing to outsource this portion of the protocol, we
eliminate a significant number of expensive public-key
cryptography operations and rounds of communication
used in oblivious transfer. The result is a more com-
putationally and bandwidth efficient outsourcing proto-
col with improved security guarantees against malicious
players [5, 19].
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
• Develop a new outsourcing protocol: We develop
the Whitewash1 outsourcing protocol, which allows
a mobile device participating in a two-party secure
function evaluation to outsource the generation of
the garbled circuit. By reversing the roles of the two
players in prior work [5, 19], we fully eliminate the
requirement for any oblivious transfers, outsourced
or otherwise, to or from the mobile device. This
“simple” role reversal requires fundamentally re-
designing the outsourcing techniques used in pre-
vious work, as well as new security proof formula-
tions.
• Formal verification and analysis: We formally de-
fine and then prove the security of our outsourc-
1A reference to Tom Sawyer, who “outsourced” his chores to his
friends without ever revealing the true nature of the work.
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ing techniques in the malicious model. Unlike pre-
vious work [5, 19], our protocol provides secu-
rity when the mobile device is colluding with its
Cloud provider against the application server. We
then provide an analysis of the reduction in opera-
tions between our work and the outsourced oblivi-
ous transfer of Carter et al. [5], as well as the Salus
framework by Kamara et al. [19]. Specifically, our
protocol requires more executions of a pseudoran-
dom number generator in exchange for fewer alge-
braic group operations and zero-knowledge proofs.
Moreover, we significantly reduce the number of
rounds of communication required to the mobile de-
vice.
• Implement and evaluate the performance of
our protocol: In our performance evaluation, we
demonstrate a maximum improvement of 98% in
execution time and 63% improvement in bandwidth
overhead compared to Carter et al. [5]. For a dif-
ferent test application, when compared to perform-
ing computation directly on the mobile device [24],
we demonstrated a 96% and 90% improvement in
execution time and bandwidth, respectively. These
improvements allow for the largest circuits evalu-
ated on any platform to be computed from a mobile
device efficiently and with equivalent security pa-
rameters to non-mobile protocols.
The rest of this work is organized as follows: Section 2
provides detail on related research; Section 3 describes
our threat model and security definition; Section 4 pro-
vides a description of the Whitewash protocol; Section 5
provides simulator proofs of security; Section 6 com-
pares the operations required in our protocol to the pro-
tocols by Carter et al. and Kamara et al.; Section 7
describes our empirical performance analysis; and Sec-
tion 8 provides concluding remarks.
2 Related Work
Fairplay [30] provided the first practically efficient im-
plementation of Yao’s garbled circuit protocol [36], re-
quiring only simple hash and symmetric key operations
to securely evaluate an arbitrary function. Since then, a
variety of garbled circuit-based SFE protocols have been
developed in the semi-honest adversarial model [3, 25,
16, 13, 17, 26, 29]. The latest of these, developed by
Huang et al. [13], allows garbled circuits to be evalu-
ated in stages, which makes it the most efficient semi-
honest garbled circuit evaluation technique, both in com-
putation and memory requirements. In recent work, sev-
eral garbled circuit SFE protocols have been developed
in the malicious security model, which require signif-
icantly more computational resources than semi-honest
protocols, but are secure against arbitrary polynomial-
time adversaries [28, 33, 32, 22, 24]. The protocol by
shelat and Shen [34] provides a two-party garbled cir-
cuit protocol which uses only symmetric-key construc-
tions outside of the oblivious transfer. When combined
with Huang’s pipelining approach and the PCF compiler
by Kreuter et al. [23], their protocol is the most effi-
cient maliciously-secure garbled circuit protocol to date.
Some efforts have been made to improve the efficiency of
these protocols by slightly reducing the adversary model.
Many schemes have been developed in the covert adver-
sary model, which allows for some efficiency gains at
the cost of security [31, 7, 12, 2]. Huang et al. [14] de-
veloped a protocol that leaks only one bit of input to a
malicious adversary through dual execution, which was
later implemented on GPUs by Hustead et al. [15]. In
order to further improve the efficiency of garbled cir-
cuit protocols, Gordon et al. [10] developed a protocol
that combined Oblivious RAM with garbled circuits, al-
lowing sub-linear amortized complexity. However, this
protocol only allows this performance gain for functions
that can be computed efficiently on a random-access ma-
chine.
To further improve the speed of cryptographic proto-
cols on devices with minimal computational resources,
the idea of outsourcing cryptographic operations has
been proposed for a variety of applications. Green
et al. [11] developed a technique for outsourcing the
costly decryption of attribute-based encryption schemes
to the cloud without revealing the contents of the cipher-
text. Atallah and Frikken [1] developed a set of special-
purpose protocols for securely outsourcing Linear Alge-
bra computations to a single cloud server. For data min-
ing applications, Kerschbaum recently developed an out-
sourced set intersection protocol using homomorphic en-
cryption techniques [20]. While all of these applications
provide significant performance gains for specific cryp-
tographic applications, none of them address outsourcing
of general secure computation.
In their Salus protocol, Kamara et al. [18, 19] devel-
oped two protocols for securely outsourcing the com-
putation of arbitrary functions to the cloud. Following
Salus, Carter et al. [5] developed an outsourcing protocol
based on the maliciously secure garbled circuit protocol
by Kreuter et al. [24]. Carter’s protocol outsources the
evaluation of garbled circuits by adding in an Outsourced
Oblivious Transfer primitive. Their participant configu-
ration is the same configuration found in Kamara’s ma-
liciously secure protocol, where the cloud is made re-
sponsible for evaluating the garbled circuit. In this work,
we build on shelat and Shen’s latest protocol, but unlike
previous work we choose to fundamentally rearrange the
roles of the participants, outsourcing the generation of
the garbled circuits as in Kamara’s covertly secure pro-
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tocol. Constructing a new protocol with this role config-
uration and the security guarantees of shelat and Shen’s
protocol allows us to develop a more efficient outsourc-
ing protocol with stronger security guarantees than any
previous outsourcing techniques.
3 Overview and Security Definitions
3.1 Protocol Goals and Summary
The primary reason for developing an outsourcing proto-
col for secure function evaluation is to allow two parties
of asymmetrical computing ability to securely compute
some result. Current two-party computation protocols
assume both parties are equipped with equivalent com-
puting resources and so require both parties to perform
comparable operations. However, when a mobile device
is taking part in computation with an application server,
some technique is necessary to reduce the complexity of
the operation on the mobile device. Ideally, we can make
the mobile device perform some small number of opera-
tions that is independent of the size of the circuit being
evaluated.
In constructing such a protocol, there are three guaran-
tees that we would like to provide. The first of these guar-
antees is correctness. It is necessary that an outsourcing
protocol must produce correct output even in the face
of malicious players attempting to corrupt the compu-
tation. The second desirable guarantee is security. SFE
protocols frequently use a simulation-based approach to
defining and proving security, which we outline in detail
below. Essentially, the goal is to show that each party
can learn the output of the computed function and noth-
ing else. Finally, an ideal protocol would provide some
guarantee of fair release. This guarantee ensures that ei-
ther both parties receive their outputs from the computa-
tion, or neither party receives their output. Our protocol
achieves this in all but one corruption scenario by treat-
ing the cloud as an arbiter, who will simultaneously and
fairly release the outputs of the protocol using one-time
pads. In the scenario where the mobile device and Cloud
are colluding, it is possible for the Cloud to terminate
the protocol after the mobile device receives output but
before the application server receives output. However,
this is inherently possible in most two-party garbled cir-
cuit protocols.
To achieve these guarantees, we first select the most
efficient two-party garbled circuit computation protocol
to date that provides guarantees of correctness and secu-
rity in the malicious model. We assign the mobile de-
vice the role of circuit generator in this protocol, and the
application server is assigned the role of circuit evalua-
tor. To outsource the circuit generation operations from
the mobile device, we allow the device to generate short
random seeds and pass these values to a Cloud compu-
tation provider, which then generates the garbled circuits
using these seeds to generate randomness. Thus, the mo-
bile device’s work is essentially reduced to (1) generat-
ing random strings on the order of a statistical security
parameter, and (2) garbling and sending its input values
to the evaluating party. In this way, we develop a secure
computation protocol where the mobile device performs
work that is independent of the size of the function being
evaluated.
3.2 Non-collusion
To maintain security, previous outsourcing protocols as-
sume that neither party colludes with the cloud [19, 5].
The theoretical justification for this constraint, outlined
by Kamara et al. [19], is that the existence of an out-
sourcing protocol where parties can arbitrarily collude
would imply a two-party secure multiparty computation
protocol where one party performs sub linear work with
respect to the size of the circuit. Since this is currently
only possible with fully homomorphic encryption, these
garbled circuit protocol must relax this security con-
straint. However, while previous protocols restrict col-
lusion between the cloud and any party, this theoretical
constraint only applies to cases when the cloud is gen-
erating circuits and colludes with the evaluating party,
or vice versa. In the Whitewash protocol, we prove se-
curity when the mobile device colludes with the cloud
against the evaluating web application. While this col-
lusion scenario removes the fair release guarantee of our
protocol, it in no way compromises the security guar-
antees of confidentiality of participant’s inputs and out-
puts. Essentially, it reduces to the two-party computation
scenario that the underlying protocol is proven to be se-
cure in. Since the mobile device is paying the Cloud for
computation services, we believe it is a more realistic
assumption to assume that a cloud provider could col-
lude maliciously with the paying customer, and note that
our protocol is the first outsourcing protocol to provide
any security guarantees in the face of collusion with the
Cloud.
3.3 Security Constructions
In the two-party computation protocol underlying our
work, shelat and Shen implement a number of new and
efficient cryptographic checks to ensure that none of
the parties participating in the computation behave mali-
ciously. We provide an overview of these security checks
in the following section. We refer the reader to shelat and
Shen’s work for more formal definitions and proofs [34].
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3.3.1 k-probe-resistant input encoding
When working with garbled circuit protocols in the ma-
licious model, the generator has the ability to learn in-
formation about the evaluator’s input by corrupting the
wire labels sent during the oblivious transfer. This at-
tack, known as selective failure, was first proposed by
Mohassel and Franklin [32] as well as Kiraz and Schoen-
makers [21]. To prevent this attack, shelat and Shen [34]
implement an improved version of the k-probe-resistant
input encoding mechanism originally proposed by Lin-
dell and Pinkas [27]. In their protocol, the evaluator Al-
ice does not input her real input y to the computation,
but chooses her input y such that M · y = y for a k-probe
resistant matrix M. Intuitively, the idea is that the gener-
ator would have to probe Alice’s input approximately 2k
times before learning anything about her real input y.
3.3.2 2-Universal Hash Function
A second concern with garbled circuits in the malicious
model is that the generator may send different input val-
ues for each of the evaluated circuits from the cut-&-
choose. To ensure that the generator’s inputs are con-
sistent across evaluation circuits, shelat and Shen imple-
ment an efficient witness-indistinguishable proof, which
computes a randomized, 2-universal hash of the input
value using only arithmetic operations on matrices. Be-
cause of the regularity guarantees of a 2-universal hash,
the outputs of these hash circuits can be seen by the eval-
uator without revealing any information about the gener-
ator’s inputs. However, if any of the hashed input values
is inconsistent across evaluation circuits, the evaluator
can infer that the generator provided inconsistent inputs,
and can terminate the protocol.
3.3.3 Output proof of consistency
When a function being evaluated using garbled circuits
has separate, private outputs for the generating and eval-
uating parties, it is necessary to ensure that the evalu-
ating party does not tamper with the generating party’s
output. Since the output must be decoded from the gar-
bled output wires for the majority check at the end of the
protocol, if the output is only blinded with a one-time
pad, this allows the evaluator the opportunity to change
bits of the generator’s output. Several techniques for
preventing this kind of tampering have been proposed,
but shelat and Shen’s latest protocol [34] implements a
witness-indistinguishable proof that uses only symmetric
key cryptographic operations. After the evaluator sends
the output of computation to the generator, the proof
guarantees to the generator that the output value he re-
ceived was actually generated by one of the garbled cir-
cuits he generated. However, it keeps the index of the
circuit that produced the output hidden, as this could leak
information to the generator.
3.4 Security Model and Definition
Our definition of security is based on the definition pro-
posed by Kamara et al. [19], which we specify for the
two-party setting as in Carter et al. [5]. We provide a
brief description of the real/ideal world model here and
direct readers to the previous work in this space for a
more formal definition.
In the real world, each party participating in the com-
putation provides an input to the computation and an aux-
iliary input of random coins, while the single party desig-
nated as the outsourcing party provides only random aux-
iliary input. The evaluating party in this computation is
assumed to be non-colluding with the outsourcing party,
as defined by Kamara et al. Some subset of these parties
A = (A1, ...,Am),m≤ 3 are corrupted and can deviate ar-
bitrarily from the protocol. For the ith honest party, let
OUTi be its output, and for the ith corrupted party, let
OUTi be its view of the protocol execution. Then the ith
partial output of a real protocol execution is defined as:
REAL(i)(k,x;r) = {OUTj : j ∈ H}∪OUTi
Where H is the set of honest parties, r is all random coins
of all participants, and k is the security parameter.
In the ideal world, each party provides the same inputs
as in the real world, however, they are sent to a trusted
oracle which performs the secure computation. Once the
trusted oracle completes the computation, it returns the
output to the participating parties and no output to the
outsourcing party. If any party aborts early or sends no
input to the oracle, the oracle aborts and does not send
the output to any party. For the ith honest party, let OUTi
be its output to the oracle, and for the ith corrupted party,
let OUTi be an arbitrary output value produced by the
party. Then the ith partial output of an ideal protocol ex-
ecution in the presence of m ≤ 3 independent malicious
simulators S = (S1,S2,S3) is defined as:
IDEAL(i)(k,x;r) = {OUTj : j ∈ H}∪OUTi
Where H,r, and k are defined as before. Given this
model, security is formally defined as:
Definition 1. An outsourcing protocol securely com-
putes the function f if there exists a set of probabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) simulators {Simi}i∈[3] such that
for all PPT adversaries (A1,A2,A3), inputs x, auxiliary
inputs z, and for all i ∈ [3]:
{REAL(i)(k,x;r)}k∈N
c≈ {IDEAL(i)(k,x;r)}k∈N
Where S = (S1,S2,S3), Si = Simi(Ai), and r is uniformly
random.
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1: Prepare input1: Prepare input
Figure 1: The complete whitewash protocol. Note that the mobile device (Bob) performs very little work compared to
the web server (Alice) and the Cloud (Cloud).
4 Protocol
4.1 Participants
Given a mobile device and a web- or application- server
who wish to jointly compute a function, there are three
participating parties in the Whitewash protocol:
• Alice: We refer to the application server participat-
ing in the joint computation as “Alice.” She is as-
sumed to have large computational resources and is
responsible for evaluating the garbled circuits.
• Bob: We refer to the mobile device participating in
the joint computation as “Bob.” He is assumed to
have limited processing power, memory, and com-
munication bandwidth.
• Cloud: We refer to the outsourcing party as
“Cloud.” Cloud is responsible for relieving Bob of
the majority of his computational load, but is not
trusted with knowing either party’s input to or out-
put from the joint computation.
4.2 Protocol
Common Inputs: Security parameters k (key length)
and σ (the number of circuits generated for the cut-&-
choose); a commitment scheme com(x;c) with commit-
ted value x and commitment key c; and a function f (x,y).
Private Inputs: Bob inputs x and Alice inputs y.
Outputs: Two outputs fa, fb for Alice and Bob, respec-
tively.
Phase 1: Pre-computation
1. Preparing inputs: Bob randomly generates r ∈
{0,1}2k+log(k) as his input to the 2-universal cir-
cuit. He also generates e ∈ {0,1}| fb| as a one-
time pad for his output. Alice computes her k-
probe-resistant matrix M and y such that M · y = y.
Bob’s input to the circuit will be x = x‖e‖r and Al-
ice’s input will be y. We denote the set of indices
[ma] = {1, · · · , |y|} and [mb] = {1, · · · , |x|}.
2. Preparing circuit randomness: Bob generates
random seeds {ρ( j)} j∈[σ ] for generating the circuits
and sends them to Cloud.
Phase 2: Input commitments
1. Committing to Bob’s inputs: For each circuit j ∈
[σ ], input bit i ∈ [mb], and b ∈ {0,1} Bob uses ρ( j)
to generate commitment keys θ ( j)i,b . These keys will
later be generated by Cloud to commit to the input
wire labels corresponding to Bob’s input. Bob then
commits to his own inputs as {Γ( j)} j∈[σ ] as:
Γ
( j) = {com(θ ( j)i,xi ;γ
( j)
i )}i∈[mb]
using independently generated random commit-
ment keys γ( j)i . Bob sends {Γ( j)} j∈[σ ] to Alice and
the commitment keys {γ( j)i }i∈[mb], j∈[σ ] to Cloud.
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2. Committing to Cloud’s inputs: To allow for a
fair release of the outputs, the cloud inputs one-
time pads to blind both parties’ outputs. Cloud ran-
domly generates pa ∈ {0,1}| fa| and pb ∈ {0,1}| fb|,
as well as rc ∈ {0,1}2k+log(k) as its input to the
2-universal circuit. We denote Cloud’s input as
z= pa‖pb‖rc, and the indices of Cloud’s input wires
as [mc] = {1, · · · , |z|}.
For each circuit j ∈ [σ ] and input bit i∈ [mc], Cloud
uses {ρ( j)} j∈[σ ] to generates the garbled input wire









and the permutation bit π( j)i ∈ {0,1}. To locate the
correct key for bit b on input wire wi of circuit j, we





Let {wma+i}i∈[mc] be the input wires for Cloud.
Cloud then commits to the label pairs for its input
wires as {Ψ( j)} j∈[σ ], where
Ψ














using commitment keys ψ( j)i,b generated with the
random seed ρ( j). Cloud then commits to its inputs
as {Ξ( j)} j∈[σ ] as:
Ξ
( j) = {com(ψ( j)i,zi ;ξ
( j)
i )}i∈[mc]
using independently generated random commit-
ment keys. Cloud sends {Ψ( j)} j∈[σ ] and {Ξ( j)} j∈[σ ]
to Alice.
Phase 3: Circuit construction
1. Constructing the objective circuit: Alice sends
M to Cloud, then Alice and Cloud run a coin flip-
ping protocol to randomly determine the 2-universal
hash matrix H ∈ {0,1}k×mb . These two matrices
can be used to generate the new circuit C that com-
putes the function g : (x,y) → (⊥,(hb,hc,ca,cb)),
where hb = H · x,hc = H · z,gb = fb(x,M · y),cb =
gb⊕e⊕ pb,ga = fa(x,M ·y), and ca = ga⊕ pa. Bob
will need the values hc‖cb to recover his output. We
denote the set of indices corresponding to these val-
ues as Ob = {1, · · · , |hc|+ |cb|}.
2. Committing to input and output wire label pairs:
Using the same method as in Step 2, Cloud uses
{ρ( j)} j∈[σ ] to generate the input wire keys for both
Alice and Bob’s input as well as the output wire
keys for Bob’s output (these output keys must be
committed for the witness indistinguishable proof
of Bob’s output correctness). Let {wi}i∈[mb] be
the input wires for Bob, {wmb+i}i∈[ma] be the input
wires for Alice, and {wi}i∈Ob . Cloud then commits
to the label pairs in Bob’s input, Alice’s input, and
Bob’s Output as {Θ( j),Ω( j),Φ( j)} j∈[σ ], where
Θ

























using commitment keys generated with the random
seed ρ( j). Cloud then sends these commitments to
Alice.
Phase 4: Oblivious transfers
1. Oblivious transfers: The Cloud and Alice execute
ma input oblivious transfers and σ circuit oblivious
transfers as follows:
(a) Input: For each i ∈ [ma], both parties run a(2
1
)
-OT where Cloud inputs(
{(W ( j)mb+i,0;ω
( j)
i )} j∈[σ ],{(W
( j)
mb+i,1
;ω( j)i )} j∈[σ ]
)
while Alice inputs yi. Once Alice receives
all of her garbled input wire labels, she
uses the decommitment keys obtained in the
OTs to check the committed wire values in
{Ω( j)} j∈[σ ]. If any of the labels received in
the OT do not match the committed wire la-
bels, Alice terminates the protocol.
(b) Circuit: Alice selects a set of circuits to be
evaluated S ⊂ [σ ] such that |S| = 2σ5 , as in
shelat and Shen’s protocol [33]. She repre-
sents this set with a bit string s ∈ {0,1}σ such
that the jth bit s j = 1 if j ∈ S and s j = 0





OTs where, for every j ∈ [σ ], Cloud inputs
(ρ( j),({γ( j)i }i∈[mb]‖{Ξ
( j)
i }i∈[mc])), while Alice
inputs s j. This allows Alice to learn either
the randomness used to generate the check cir-
cuits or Bob and Cloud’s inputs for the evalua-
tion circuits without the cloud knowing which
circuits are being checked or evaluated.
Phase 5: Evaluation
1. Circuit evaluation: Using ρ( j), Cloud garbles the
objective circuit C as G(C)( j) for all j ∈ [σ ] and
pipelines these circuits to Alice using Huang’s tech-
nique [13]. Depending on whether the circuit is
a check circuit or an evaluation circuit, Alice per-
forms one of two actions:
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(a) Check: For each j ∈ [σ ]\S, Alice checks to
see if ρ( j) can correctly regenerate the com-
mitted wire values {Θ( j),Ω( j),Φ( j),Ψ( j)} and
the circuit G(C)( j).
(b) Evaluate: For each j ∈ S, Alice checks that
she can correctly decommit Bob’s input by re-
covering half of Θ( j) from the keys committed
in Γ( j). She does the same for Cloud’s input,
recovering half of Ψ( j) from the keys commit-
ted in Ξ( j)
If any of the above checks fail, Alice aborts the
protocol. Otherwise, she evaluates the circuits







b ) for j ∈ [σ ]\S.
2. Majority output selection and consistency check:
Let (hb,hc,ca,cb) be the output of the majority of
the evaluated circuits. If no majority value exists,
Alice aborts the protocol. Otherwise, she checks
that h( j)b = hb and h
( j)
c = hc for all j ∈ [σ ]\S. If any
of Bob or Cloud’s hashed input values do not match,
Alice aborts the protocol.
Phase 6: Output proof and release
1. Proof of output authenticity: Alice and Bob per-
form the proof of authenticity from shelat and
Shen’s protocol [34] using the commitments to
Bob’s output wires {Φ( j)} j∈[σ ]\S and the values
hc‖cb which are to be proven correct.
2. Output release: Cloud simultaneously releases the
input one-time pads pa and pb to Alice and Bob.
Alice and Bob then hash the pads and check to see if
the hash values output by the circuit hc = H · pa‖pb.
If the hashes do not match, Alice and Bob abort the
protocol. Otherwise, Alice receives ca⊕ pa as her
output and Bob receives cb⊕ pb⊕ e as his output.
5 Proof of Security
Following the security definition from Section 3, we
prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The Whitewash outsourced two-party SFE
protocol securely computes a function f (a,b) in the fol-
lowing three corruption scenarios: (1) The cloud is ma-
licious and non-cooperative with respect to the rest of
the parties, while all other parties are semi-honest; (2)
All but one party providing input is malicious, while the
cloud is semi-honest; or (3) The cloud and mobile de-
vice are malicious and colluding, while the evaluator is
semi-honest.
Note that existing outsourcing schemes [19, 5] are
only secure in corruption scenarios (1) and (2).
5.1 Malicious application server A∗
Consider when Alice can perform arbitrarily malicious
actions while Bob and Cloud follow the protocol in a
semi-honest manner. We note that the operations per-
formed by A∗ and the messages received by A∗ are
nearly identical to the malicious evaluator P∗2 from she-
lat and Shen’s proof of their two-party computation
scheme [34]. We note here four slight alterations nec-
essary to their simulator S2, none of which change their
proof of security. We call the modified simulator SA
1. Input generation: When SA generates a random in-
put x′ for Bob, it also generates a random input z′ for
Cloud. Because this input is chosen from a uniform
distribution in both the real and the ideal world, it is
statistically indistinguishable.
2. Input commitments: When SA generates the input
commitments {Γ( j)} j∈σ , it also generates commit-
ments {Ξ( j)} j∈σ to commit to Cloud’s input.
3. Wire label commitments: When SA generates the
commitments to its input wires {Θ( j)} j∈σ , it also
generates commitments to Cloud’s input wire labels
{Ψ( j)} j∈σ .
4. Output proof: If A∗ successfully proves the cor-
rectness of Bob’s output, the simulator SA delivers
the random input z′ to A∗. As stated above, this
input is statistically indistinguishable from Cloud’s
input in the real world.
Given the existence of the simulator SA, this proves
security when the evaluating party A∗ is malicious (sce-
nario 2).
5.2 Malicious mobile device B∗
Consider when Bob can perform arbitrarily malicious
actions while Alice and Cloud follow the protocol in a
semi-honest manner. We construct a simulator SB in the
ideal world to simulate Bob’s view of a real execution
of the protocol. Note that the simulator does not have
the other parties’ inputs, nor does it know what input
the malicious B∗ will use. Thus, Bob’s inputs and
commitments must be checked, and the output proof and
result of computation must be simulated. Consider the
following hybrid of experiments.
Hybrid1(B)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to the
experiment REAL(B)(k,x;r) except that the experiment
receives the values {ρ( j)} j∈σ ,{γ( j)} j∈σ , and {Γ( j)} j∈σ
from B∗ and uses them to recover B∗s input. If for any
j ∈ S, the decommitment Γ( j) cannot reveal B∗s input





Proof. Because the experiment is in control of Alice and
Cloud, for any j ∈ σ we know that the commitment Θ( j)
is constructed correctly using ρ( j). Thus, the only pos-
sible way that the experiment will not uncover the value
for some x∗( j) is if {θ ( j)i,x∗i }i∈[mb], when decommitted from
Γ( j) using γ( j) correctly decommits the i⊕1 half of Θ( j),
which happens with negligible probability based on the
binding property of the commitment. Otherwise, at least
one of the two commitments Γ( j) or Θ( j)i must fail to de-
commit, in which case both experiments abort.
Hybrid2(B)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to
the experiment Hybrid1(B)(k,x;r) except that if the ex-




Proof. This follows from the 2-universal hash check of
consistency. Since all of the circuits are generated by
the experiment as cloud, they are all constructed cor-
rectly. Following from Lemma G.10 in shelat and Shen’s
proof [34], indistinguishability holds here.
Hybrid3(B)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to the
experiment Hybrid2(B)(k,x;r) except that the experi-
ment passes x∗ to the trusted third party and receives
fb(x∗,y) in return. It then randomly selects an eval-
uated circuit G(C)( j) and uses the output keys from
that circuit to run the output proof of correctness for
fb(x∗,y)⊕ e∗⊕ pb with B∗.
Lemma 3. Hybrid2(B)(k,x;r)
c≈ Hybrid3(B)(k,x;r)
Proof. This follows from the witness-
indistinguishability property of the output proof,
which guarantees that the index of the circuit output
being sent remains hidden. Indistinguishability fol-
lows directly from Lemma G.12 in shelat and Shen’s
proof [34].
Hybrid4(B)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to the
experiment Hybrid3(B)(k,x;r) except that the experi-
ment selects random inputs for Alice a′ and Cloud z′ fol-




Proof. This follows from the security guarantees of the
garbled circuit itself. Since the output of the circuit in the
real world matches the output of the trusted third party in
the ideal world, B∗ learns nothing from the output re-
ceived. Since the output produced by replacing Alice’s
input with random inputs is never returned to B∗, he can-
not distinguish between Alice’s real inputs and the ran-
dom inputs. Finally, since Cloud’s input is two pseudo-
random strings in the real protocol, it is statistically in-
distinguishable from the experiment’s choice of z′. Thus,
indistinguishability holds even when z′ is revealed in the
output release phase.
Lemma 5. Hybrid4(B)(k,x;r) runs in polynomial time.
Proof. This follows trivially from the fact that the main
protocol runs in polynomial time. Since the experiment
does not perform any additional actions beyond the main
protocol, it also runs in polynomial time.
Hybrid4(B)(k,x;r) is identical to the simulator SB run-
ning in the ideal world. The simulator runs B∗ and con-
trols Alice and Cloud. If any of the consistency checks
fails, SB terminates the protocol. Otherwise, it delivers
B∗s input to the trusted third party in Hybrid3(B)(k,x;r),
and outputs whatever B∗ outputs. By Lemma 1-5, this
simulator proves Theorem 1 when the mobile device is
malicious (scenario 2).
5.3 Malicious cloud C∗
Consider when Cloud can perform arbitrary malicious
actions while Alice and Bob follow the protocol in a
semi-honest manner. We construct a simulator SC in the
ideal world to simulate Cloud’s view of a real execution
of the protocol. Note that since the simulator does not
have the other parties’ inputs, nor does it know what
input the malicious C∗ will use. Thus, the inputs, com-
mitments, and circuits generated by the cloud must be
checked, and the oblivious transfers must be simulated.
Consider the following hybrid of experiments.
Hybrid1(C)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to the
experiment REAL(C)(k,x;r) except that instead of run-
ning the circuit oblivious transfers, the experiment in-
vokes the simulator SOT , which recovers both of C∗s
inputs to the oblivious transfer (i.e., the random coins
{ρ( j)} j∈σ and the commitment keys {ξ ( j)} j∈σ ).
Lemma 6. REAL(C)(k,x;r)
c≈ Hybrid1(C)(k,x;r)
Proof. Based on the malicious security of the oblivious
transfer primitive, we know that SOT exists. The proof of
this lemma follows directly from Lemma G.7 in shelat
and Shen’s security proof [34].
Hybrid2(C)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to the
experiment Hybrid1(C)(k,x;r) except that if more than





Proof. For a circuit to be incorrectly constructed means
that the commitments {Θ( j),Ω( j),Φ( j),Ψ( j)} and the cir-
cuit G(C)( j), for j ∈ σ , cannot be reconstructed given the
objective circuit C and the randomness ρ( j). Again, this
lemma follows directly from Lemma G.8 in shelat and
Shen’s proof [34].
Hybrid3(C)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to the
experiment Hybrid2(C)(k,x;r) except that the experi-
ment will abort if C∗s private inputs cannot be recovered
for at least σ/5 of the evaluation circuits.
Lemma 8. Hybrid2(C)(k,x;r)
c≈ Hybrid3(C)(k,x;r)
Proof. From the previous lemma, we know that 4σ/5 of
the circuits are correctly constructed. This implies that of
the 2σ/5 circuits chosen to be evaluated, at least σ/5 are
“good” circuits. Let these “good” circuits be denoted as
G, where |G| ≥ σ/5. Assume for contradiction that there
is some j ∈G where z∗( j) cannot be recovered. The only
possible way that the experiment will not uncover the
value for some z∗( j) is if {ψ( j)i,z∗i }i∈[mc], when decommitted
from Ξ( j) using ξ ( j) correctly decommits the i⊕1 half of
Ψ( j), which happens with negligible probability based on
the binding property of the commitment. Otherwise, at
least one of the two commitments Ξ( j) or Ψ( j)i must fail
to decommit, in which case both experiments abort.
Hybrid4(C)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to the
experiment Hybrid3(C)(k,x;r) except that the experi-





Proof. Informally, this proof follows from the 2-
universal hash check used in the circuit. This lemma
follows directly from Lemma G.10 in shelat and Shen’s
proof [34].
Hybrid5(C)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to the
experiment Hybrid4(C)(k,x;r) except that the experi-
ment chooses a random input for Alice y′ and computes




Proof. Informally, this proof follows from the choose se-
curity of the OT primitive. This lemma follows directly
from Lemma G.14 in shelat and Shen’s proof [34].
Hybrid6(C)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to the
experiment Hybrid5(C)(k,x;r) except that the experi-
ment chooses a random input for Bob x′ and computes
x′ by concatenating random strings e′ and r′ to x′ and
uses these inputs as input to the computation.
Lemma 11. Hybrid5(C)(k,x;r)
c≈ Hybrid6(C)(k,x;r)
Proof. Because C∗ never receives Bob’s inputs in any
form, or output from the computation, he cannot distin-
guish between using Bob’s real inputs and random inputs
chosen by the experiment. Since C∗ only ever sees Bob’s
input commitment keys {γ( j)} j∈σ , which are pseudoran-
dom strings in both experiments, these strings are statis-
tically indistinguishable as well.
Hybrid7(C)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to the
experiment Hybrid6(C)(k,x;r) except that the simulator
runs the function f (x′,y′) for the inputs randomly cho-
sen in the previous lemma. If f1(x′,y′)⊕ e∗ ⊕ pb and
f2(x′,y′)⊕ pa do not match a majority of the evaluation
outputs, the experiment aborts.
Lemma 12. Hybrid6(C)(k,x;r)
c≈ Hybrid7(C)(k,x;r)
Proof. This follows trivially from the fact that at least
σ/5 circuits are correctly constructed and that C∗s inputs
to those circuits are consistent. Thus, the majority output
will be exactly f1(x′,y′)⊕e∗⊕ pb and f2(x′,y′)⊕ pa.
Hybrid8(C)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to the
experiment Hybrid7(C)(k,x;r) except that when C∗ re-
turns the one-time pads w∗ in the output release, the ex-
periment aborts if w∗ 6= z∗, where z∗ is the consistent in-
put to the good circuits in G. Otherwise, the experiment
sends z∗ to the trusted third party as C∗s input.
Lemma 13. Hybrid7(C)(k,x;r)
c≈ Hybrid8(C)(k,x;r)
Proof. This follows from the collision-resistance of the
2-universal hash family. C∗ can only return a value w∗
such that H ·w∗ = H · z∗ with negligible probability, and
so the experiments are indistinguishable.
Lemma 14. Hybrid8(C)(k,x;r) runs in polynomial time.
Proof. This follows trivially from the fact that the main
protocol runs in polynomial time. Since the experiment
only evaluates f (·, ·) (which is also polynomial time) in
addition to the main protocol, it also runs in polynomial
time.
Hybrid8(C)(k,x;r) is identical to the simulator SC run-
ning in the ideal world. The simulator runs C∗ and con-
trols Alice and Bob. If any of the consistency checks
fails, SC terminates the protocol. Otherwise, it deliv-
ers C∗s input to the trusted third party when it is com-
pletes Hybrid8(B)(k,x;r), and outputs whatever C∗ out-
puts. By Lemma 6-14, this simulator proves Theorem 1
when Cloud is malicious (scenario 1).
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5.4 Malicious and colluding mobile device
and cloud BC∗
Consider when Bob and Cloud can perform arbitrary
malicious actions and share arbitrary information while
Alice follows the protocol in a semi-honest manner. We
observe that this scenario is equivalent to a malicious
generator P∗1 in shelat and Shen’s proof of security [34],
with some modifications to the lemmas to account for
communicating with two parties and to account for
Cloud’s added input. We also note that in this scenario,
the malicious and colluding BC∗ may terminate the
protocol early, preventing Alice from receiving her
output. However, this is possible on the evaluator’s side
in shelat and Shen’s protocol, so we consider fair release
a separate guarantee from security. We describe the
changes to each hybrid experiment in shelat and Shen’s
proof below, as well as noting slight changes to the
proofs of each lemma.
Hybrid1(BC)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical
to the experiment REAL(BC)(k,x;r) except that in-
stead of running the circuit oblivious transfers, the
experiment invokes the simulator SOT , which recovers
both of C∗s inputs to the oblivious transfer (i.e., the
random coins {ρ( j)} j∈σ and the commitment keys
{γ( j)} j∈σ ,{ξ ( j)} j∈σ ).
The proof of this hybrid follows directly from shelat
and Shen, only it is extended to recover the commitments
to C∗s input as well as B∗s.
Hybrid2(BC)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to
the experiment Hybrid1(BC)(k,x;r) except that if more
than σ/5 circuits are incorrectly constructed, then the
experiment aborts.
Again, this follows directly from shelat and Shen.
However, the commitments to the Cloud’s input wires
{Ψ( j)} j∈σ must also be checked.
Hybrid3(BC)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to the
experiment Hybrid2(BC)(k,x;r) except that the experi-
ment will abort if both B∗ and C∗s private inputs cannot




Proof. This lemma holds in the same manner as
Lemma 8 when only the Cloud is malicious. Since the
commitments Θ( j) and Ψ( j) are constructed correctly, the
only way that the input of either B∗ or C∗ cannot be re-
covered is if the decommited values from Γ( j) and Ξ( j)
decommitted the wrong halves of the commitments Θ( j)
and Ψ( j) respectively. This would imply that B∗ or C∗
was able to break the binding property of the commit-
ment, which can only happen with negligible probabil-
ity.
Hybrid4(BC)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical
to the experiment Hybrid3(BC)(k,x;r) except that the
experiment aborts if any of B∗ or C∗s inputs to the good
circuits in G are inconsistent.
Again, this follows directly from shelat and Shen, ex-
panded to handle the inputs of both malicious parties.
Hybrid5(BC)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to
the experiment Hybrid4(BC)(k,x;r) except that the input
recovered in the previous hybrid, x∗ = x∗||r∗||e∗ and
z∗ = p∗a||p∗b are forwarded to the trusted third party,
which returns f (x∗,y,z∗). The experiment aborts if
the majority output of the computation does not match
fb(x∗,y)⊕ e∗⊕ pb.
Here we extend shelat and Shen to include the input
from Cloud, which is added in as a blind to the output of
computation in the real protocol.
Hybrid6(BC)(k, x; r),Hybrid7(BC)(k, x; r),
Hybrid8(BC)(k, x; r): These hybrid experiments are
identical to the hybrids in shelat and Shen’s proof. So,
we invoke them directly and the proofs follow as they
are in the two-party case.
Finally, we demonstrate that in the final step of the
Whitewash protocol, the output release, that early termi-
nation by B∗ or C∗ is functionally the same as C∗ return-
ing an incorrect value for p∗a. That is, Alice will always
detect an early termination, and will always detect an in-
correct value of p∗a except for a negligible probability.
Lemma 16. The probability of catching a malformed p∗a
is computationally indistinguishable from catching early
termination.
Proof. Since the output fa(x∗,y)⊕ p∗a was generated by a
good circuit and C∗s input to that circuit was consistent,
then the output of the hash H · p∗a is correctly computed.
Thus, let pa be the value that C
∗ returns during the out-
put release. By the guarantees of a 2-universal hash, the
probability that H · p∗a = H · pa is negligible.
Given these changes to the simulator S1 in shelat and
Shen’s proof, the modified simulator SBC proves Theo-
rem 1 (without the fair release guarantee) when the mo-
bile device and Cloud are malicious and colluding (sce-
nario 3).
10
Protocol Symmetric ops Asymmetric/group ops Oblivious transfers coin toss
CMTB |x| 2σ5 (|y|+1) k yes
Salus 2σ5 (|x|+ |y|+ | f (x,y)|) - - yes
Whitewash σ(|x|+ 25 | fb(x,y)|) - - no
Table 1: Operations required on the mobile device by three outsourcing protocols. Recall that k is the security param-
eter, σ is the number of circuits generated, x is the mobile device’s input, and y is the application server’s input.
6 Comparison with previous outsourcing
protocols
In this section, we compare the asymptotic complexity
and security guarantees of the Whitewash protocol to two
previous outsourcing techniques: the protocol developed
by Carter et al. [5], which we call “CMTB” for the re-
mainder of this work, and the Salus framework devel-
oped by Kamara et al. [19].
6.1 Comparison to CMTB
The underlying two-party computation protocols of
Whitewash and CMTB follow very similar structures in
terms of the security checks that are performed. How-
ever, the KSS protocol, which underlies CMTB, uses a
number of algebraic operations to perform input consis-
tency checks and output proofs of consistency. The pro-
tocol developed by shelat and Shen [34], which under-
lies Whitewash, removes these expensive cryptographic
primitives in favor of constructions that use only effi-
cient, symmetric-key operations. In addition to the im-
provements to the underlying protocol, Whitewash out-
sources the generation side of two-party computation,
while CMTB outsources the evaluation side. In CMTB,
since neither the mobile device or the cloud could gar-
ble inputs before computation, a specially designed Out-
sourced Oblivious Transfer (OOT) protocol is necessary
to deliver the mobile device’s inputs to the evaluating
cloud in a secure, privacy-preserving manner. By swap-
ping roles in the Whitewash protocol, we allow the mo-
bile device to garble its own inputs, removing the need
for any oblivious transfer protocol to be performed from
the mobile device. While Whitewash still requires OTs
between the cloud and the evaluating party, these opera-
tions can be parallelized, while the OOT protocol acts as
a non-parallelizable bottleneck in computation.
6.1.1 Asymptotic Complexity
When examining the complexity of each protocol, our
goal is to optimize the efficiency on the mobile device.
Thus, we examine the number of operations each proto-
col requires on the mobile device itself. Table 1 shows
this complexity for both Whitewash and CMTB. Note
that for the mobile device, Whitewash requires signif-
icantly more symmetric key operations for garbling its
own input and verifying the correctness of its output.
By contrast, the OOT protocol in CMTB requires very
few symmetric key operations, but requires several in-
stantiations of an oblivious transfer. In addition, CMTB
requires that the mobile device check the application
server’s input consistency and verify the correctness of
the output using algebraic operations (e.g., modular ex-
ponentiations and homomorphic operations). Consider-
ing the fact that modular exponentiation is significantly
more costly than symmetric key operations, removing
these public key operations from the phone is a signif-
icant efficiency improvement for Whitewash. We also
note that CMTB requires a two-party fair coin toss at the
mobile device, which is not required by Whitewash.
6.1.2 Security Guarantees
The removal of the OOT protocol in Whitewash not only
increases its efficiency when compared to CMTB, it also
allows for stronger security guarantees. In CMTB, secu-
rity was only possible if none of the parties collude, since
the mobile device possessed information that would al-
low the Cloud to recover both input wire labels for all
of the mobile input wires after the OOT. If the mobile
device and cloud collude in the Whitewash protocol, it
simply removes the guarantee of fair release and makes
the protocol equivalent to the underlying two-party com-
putation protocol. Thus, the only guarantee lost is that of
fair release at the end of the protocol, since a colluding
mobile device and cloud may not release the one-time
pad used to blind the evaluating party’s output. We be-
lieve that this represents a more realistic security setting,
since the mobile device is paying for the assistance of the
Cloud and may collude.
6.2 Comparison to Salus
When considering the operations performed on the mo-
bile device, the Salus protocol and the Whitewash pro-
tocol follow similar steps, with the mobile device being
responsible for generating circuit randomness and gar-
bling its own inputs. However, the Whitewash proto-
col requires an added proof of output consistency that is
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not included in Salus. While this proof adds some com-
plexity to the protocol, it allows Whitewash to handle
functions where both parties get different output values,
while Salus is designed to handle functions with a single,
shared output value. In addition, the Whitewash protocol
outsources the generation of the garbled circuit, while
the malicious secure Salus protocol outsources the eval-
uation. By swapping the roles of the outsourced task and
adding in consistency checks at the evaluating party, the
Whitewash protocol guarantees security in a stronger ad-
versarial model.
6.2.1 Asymptotic Complexity
Table 1 shows the number of operations performed on
the mobile device for both Salus and Whitewash. Both
protocols use only efficient, symmetric key operations,
but there is a slight tradeoff in the number of operations
required. Salus only requires operations for the 2σ5 eval-
uated circuits, but requires those operations for each bit
of both party’s inputs and the shared output. By con-
trast, Whitewash requires that the mobile device’s input
be committed for all σ circuits generated, but then only
requires correctness proof of the output wires on the 2σ5
evaluated circuits. When the application server’s input
is significantly longer than the mobile device’s, this will
cause the Salus protocol to be less efficient than White-
wash. However, in the average case where both inputs
are approximately the same length, this will mean that
Whitewash requires more operations. This small tradeoff
in efficiency is justified by the fact that Whitewash pro-
vides security in a stronger adversarial model than Salus.
We also note that Salus requires a two-party fair coin
toss before the protocol begins, which is not required by
Whitewash.
6.2.2 Security Guarantees
The Salus protocol provides equivalent security guaran-
tees to CMTB, guaranteeing security when none of the
parties are colluding. This is a result of outsourcing the
evaluation to the Cloud while allowing the mobile device
to generate circuit randomness. If the mobile device col-
ludes with the cloud, they can trivially recover all of the
other party’s inputs. By outsourcing the generation of
the garbled circuit and adding in additional consistency
checks at the evaluating party, Whitewash guarantees se-
curity under this type of collusion. As stated above, the
only guarantee lost is that of fair output release, which
ultimately reduces Whitewash to the security of the un-
derlying two-party computation protocol.
7 Performance Evaluation
Our protocol is built on top of the implementations of the
PCF garbled circuit generation technique [23] and shelat
and Shen’s garbled circuit evaluation protocol [34]. For
experimental comparison to previous protocols, we ac-
quired the code implementation of the outsourcing pro-
tocol by Carter et al. [5] directly from the authors, as well
as an Android port of the two-party garbled circuit pro-
tocol developed by Kreuter, shelat, and Shen [24]. For
the remainder of the work, we refer to these protocols as
CMTB and KSS respectively. We would like to thank the
authors of [5, 24, 23, 34] for making their code available
and for assisting us in running this performance evalua-
tion2.
7.1 Test Environment
For evaluating our test circuits, we perform our experi-
ments with a single server performing the role of Cloud
and Application server, communicating with a mobile
device over an 802.11g wireless connection. The server
is equipped with 64 cores and 1TB of memory, and we
partition the work between cores into parallel processing
nodes using MPI. The mobile device used is a Samsung
Galaxy Nexus with a 1.2 GHz dual-core ARM Cortex-
A9 processor and 1 GB of RAM, running Android 4.0.
The large input sizes examined in the Hamming Dis-
tance trials required us to use a different testbed. For
inputs as large as 16,384 bits, the phone provided by the
above computing facility would overheat and fail to com-
plete computation. Because the gate counts for Ham-
ming Distance are significantly smaller than the other test
circuits, we were able to run these experiments on a lo-
cal testbed. We used two servers with Dual Intel Xeon
E5620 processors, each with 4 hyper-threaded cores at
2.4 GHz each for the Cloud and the application server.
Each server is running the Linux kernel version 2.6, and
is connected by a VLAN through a 1 Gbps switch. Our
mobile device is a Samsung Galaxy Note II with a 1.6
GHz quad-core processor with Arm Cortex A9 cores and
2 GB of RAM, running the Android operating system
at version 4.1. The phone connects to the two servers
through a Linksys 802.11g wireless router with a maxi-
mum data rate of 54 Mbps. For all experiments except
RSA-256, we take the average execution time over ten
test runs, with a confidence interval of 95%. For RSA-
256, we ran 3 executions.
2We contacted the authors of the Salus protocol [19] in an attempt
to acquire their framework to compare the actual performance of their
scheme with ours, but they were unable to release their code. Moreover,
the authors noted in an email that the results reported in their work
were not accurate, so no sound comparison to their work beyond an
asymptotic analysis was possible. Our code will be made available
immediately on publication.
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Input Size Total Gates Non-XOR Gates
Circuit (Bits) KSS PCF KSS PCF
Hamming (1600) 1,600 24,379 32,912 17,234 6,375
Hamming (16384) 16,384 262,771 376,176 186,326 101,083
Matrix (3x3) 288 424,748 92,961 263,511 27,369
Matrix (5x5) 800 1,968,452 433,475 1,221,475 127,225
Matrix (8x8) 2,048 8,067,458 1,782,656 5,006,656 522,304
Matrix (16x16) 8,192 64,570,969 14,308,864 40,076,631 4,186,368
RSA-256 256/512 934,092,960 673,105,990 602,006,981 235,925,023
Table 2: Input size and circuit size for all test circuits evaluated.
7.2 Experimental Circuits
To evaluate the performance of our protocol, we run tests
over the following functions. We selected the following
test circuits because they exercise a range of the two ma-
jor variables that affect the speed of garbled circuit pro-
tocols: input size and gate counts. All of the programs
are implemented with the algorithms used by Kreuter et
al. [23]:
1. Hamming Distance: The Hamming Distance cir-
cuit accepts binary string inputs from both par-
ties and outputs the number of locations at which
those strings differ. This circuit demonstrates per-
formance for a small number of gates over a wide
range of input sizes. We consider input strings of
length 1,600 bits and 16,384 bits.
2. Matrix Multiplication: Matrix multiplication
takes an n× n matrix of 32-bit integer entries from
each party and outputs the result of multiplying the
matrices together. This circuit demonstrates perfor-
mance when both input size and gate count vary
widely. We consider square matrix inputs where
n = 3,5,8, and 16.
3. RSA Function: The RSA function (i.e., modular
exponentiation) accepts an RSA message from one
party and an RSA public key from the other party
and outputs the encryption of the input plaintext un-
der the input public key. Specifically, one party in-
puts the modulus n = pq for primes p and q, as well
as the encryption key e ∈ Zφ(n). The other party
inputs a message x ∈ Z∗n, and the circuit computes
xe (mod n). This circuit demonstrates performance
for small input sizes over very large gate counts. We
consider the case where the input values x,n, and e
are 256 bits each.
For each test circuit, we consider the time required to
execute and the bandwidth overhead to the mobile de-
vice. Table 2 shows the input size and gate counts for
each test circuit, showing the exact range of values tested
for these two circuit variables.
7.3 Execution Time
In all experiments, the efficiency gains of removing
oblivious transfers and public key operations are imme-
diately apparent. To examine how Whitewash compares
to generating garbled circuits directly on the mobile de-
vice, we considered Hamming Distance as a simple prob-
lem (Figure 2). Even with a relatively small gate count,
garbling the circuit directly on the mobile device is only
possible for the small input size of 1,600 bits. Whitewash
is capable of executing this protocol in 96 seconds, while
running the computation directly on the mobile device
takes 2,613 seconds, representing a 96% performance
improvement through our outsourcing scheme. For the
very large input size of 16,384 bits, computation directly
on the mobile device ceases to be possible. When com-
paring to CMTB, this circuit further illustrates the cost
of oblivious transfers on the mobile device. Even with
the significantly reduced number of OTs allowed by the
OOT protocol in CMTB (80 OTs), performing 16,384
malicious secure oblivious transfers between two servers
in Whitewash still runs 30% faster than CMTB.
The matrix-multiplication circuit provides a good
overview of average-case garbled circuit performance,
as it represents a large range of both gate counts and
size of inputs. For the input size of a 3× 3 matrix, the
Whitewash protocol runs in an average of 12 seconds,
while CMTB requires 493 seconds, representing a 98%
improvement (see Figure 3). Upon inspecting the mi-
cro benchmarking breakdown of each protocol’s execu-
tion in Figure 4, we observe a significant speedup sim-
ply by moving oblivious transfers off of the mobile de-
vice. Even though the number of OTs required by CMTB
is essentially constant based on their application of the
Ishai OT extension, performing standard malicious se-
cure oblivious transfers in parallel between the servers is
much more efficient than requiring that the phone per-
form these costly operations. In addition, if we exam-
ine the amount of execution time where the phone par-
ticipates in Whitewash, we see that the mobile device
(“MOBI” in Figure 4), takes around 1 second, and is
idle during the majority of computation. By contrast,
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Figure 2: Execution time (ms) for Hamming Distance
with input sizes of 1,600 and 16,384 bits for k = 256
(note: log scale). Note that without outsourcing, only
very small inputs can be computed over. Additionally,
even for a large number of input bits, performing OTs on
the servers still produces a faster execution time.
both the OT and consistency check phases of CMTB re-
quire the mobile device to participate in a significant ca-
pacity, totaling to almost 8 minutes of the computation.
Having the phone perform as little computation as possi-
ble means that the Whitewash protocol performance is
nearly equivalent to performing the same computation
between two server-class machines.
The previous experiments clearly show that outsourc-
ing is necessary to run circuits of any practical size. For
our final test circuit, we consider an extremely complex
problem to demonstrate the ability of outsourcing proto-
cols in the worst-case. The RSA-256 circuit evaluated
by Kreuter et al. in [23] and shelat and Shen in [34]
represents one of the largest garbled circuits ever evalu-
ated in the literature. For the RSA-256 problem, White-
wash completed the computation in 515 minutes. CMTB
was unable to complete one execution of the protocol.
A large part of this efficiency improvement results from
the underlying protocol of Whitewash, which uses only
symmetric-key operations outside of the oblivious trans-
fers between the servers. The reduced non-XOR gate
counts and more compact circuit representation of the
PCF compiler also contribute to this improvement. Ul-
timately, because Whitewash ensures that the phone par-
ticipates minimally in the protocol, we essentially reduce
performance improvements to those of the underlying
protocol, allowing this technique for outsourcing to ben-
efit as more improvements are made in non-outsourced
garbled circuit protocols. In addition, this minimal level
of interactivity allows us to run these protocols with 256
circuits, equivalent to a security parameter of approxi-
mately 80-bit security, which is agreed by the research

















Figure 3: Execution time (ms) for the Matrix-
Multiplication problem with input size varying between
3× 3 matrices and 16× 16 matrices for k = 256 (note:
log scale). This figure clearly shows that the oblivious
transfers, consistency checks, and larger circuit repre-
sentations of CMTB add up to a significant overhead as
input size and gate count increase. By contrast, White-
wash requires less overhead and increases more slowly
in execution time as gate counts and input size grow.
community to be an adequate security parameter. This
shows that Whitewash is capable of evaluating the same
circuits as the most efficient desktop-based garbled cir-
cuit protocols with a minimal overhead cost. For full
experimental results, see Appendix A.
7.4 Network Bandwidth
The Whitewash protocol not only improves the speed of
execution when outsourcing garbled circuit computation,
it also significantly reduces the amount of bandwidth re-
quired by the mobile device to participate in the compu-
tation. Table 3 shows the bandwidth used by the mo-
bile device for each test circuit. In the best case, for
matrix-multiply with 3× 3 matrix inputs, we observed
a 63% reduction in bandwidth between Whitewash and
CMTB. This is a result of the mobile device not perform-
ing OTs and only sending relatively small symmetric-
key values instead of algebraic elements for consistency
checks. For all test circuits, we observed a small decrease
in the amount of improvement between the two protocols
as the input size increased. This is because the num-
ber of commitments sent by the phone in Whitewash in-
creases as the size of the input grows, while CMTB per-
forms a fixed number of OTs as the input size increases.
However, the obvious transfers still require a significant
enough amount of bandwidth to make removing them
the most efficient option. When comparing to not out-
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Bandwidth (MB) Reduction Over
Circuit WW CMTB KSS CMTB KSS
Hamming (1600) 23.56 41.05 240.33 42.62% 90.20%
Hamming (16384) 241.02 374.03 x 35.56% x
Matrix (3x3) 4.26 11.50 x 62.97% x
Matrix (5x5) 11.79 23.04 x 48.82% x
Matrix (8x8) 30.15 51.14 x 41.05% x
Matrix (16x16) 120.52 189.52 x 36.41% x
RSA-256 3.97 x x x x
Table 3: Bandwidth measures for all experiment circuits. Note that there is as much as a 63% reduction in bandwidth






















Figure 4: Microbenchmarking execution times (ms) for
Whitewash and CMTB over the Matrix-Multiplication
problem. We denote the total time spent in computa-
tion for Whitewash as “MOBI”. Since the mobile device
is linked with “CHKS” and “OT” in CMTB, we do not
separate out the mobile time for that protocol. Notice the
dominating amount of time required to perform oblivious
transfers. Moving these operations off the mobile device
removes a significant computation bottleneck.
sourcing garbled circuit generation, the cost of oblivi-
ous transfers and sending several copies of the garbled
circuit to the evaluator quickly adds up to a significant
bandwidth cost. For the smallest circuit evaluated, out-
sourcing the circuit garbling reduces the required amount
of bandwidth by 90%. The importance of these band-
width reductions is further highlighted when considering
mobile power savings. With data transmission costing
roughly 100 times as much power as computation on the
same amount of data, any reduction in the bandwidth re-
quired by a protocol implies a critical improvement in
practicality.
One challenge encountered during the implementa-
tion of the Whitewash protocol was the extensive use of
hardware-specific functions used to implement commit-
ment schemes in shelat and Shen’s code. Rather than try
to port this code over to Android, which would require
significant development of hardware-specific libraries,
we chose to implement the protocol in an equivalently
secure manner by having the Cloud generate part of the
commitments (which requires these functions) and send
them to the mobile device. The mobile device then fin-
ishes generating the commitments that match its input
and forwards them to the evaluator. If we were to imple-
ment these machine-specific instruction, we could fur-
ther reduce the measured bandwidth values by over 60%.
With already significant bandwidth reductions from pre-
vious outsourcing schemes, our protocol will see further
improvements as mobile hardware begins to incorporate
these machine-specific libraries in the next few years.
8 Conclusion
With the increasingly pervasive and personal nature
of mobile computing, garbled circuits provide a solu-
tion that preserves both user privacy and application
functionality. However, to make these computationally
expensive protocols usable on mobile devices, secure
outsourcing to the cloud is necessary. We develop a
new scheme that eliminates the most costly operations,
including oblivious transfers, from the mobile device.
By requiring that the mobile device instead produce
the randomness required for circuit generation, we
significantly reduce the number of algebraic group
operations and communication rounds for the mobile
device. Our performance evaluation shows performance
gains as high as 98% for execution time and 63% for
bandwidth over the previous outsourcing protocol.
These improvements allow large circuits representing
practical applications to be computed efficiently from
a mobile device. As a result, we show that the use
of garbled circuits can be made nearly as efficient
for mobile devices as it is becoming for server-class
machines.
15
Acknowledgments This material is based on research
sponsored by DARPA under agreement number FA8750-
11-2-0211. The U.S. Government is authorized to repro-
duce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes
notwithstanding any copyright notation thereon. The
views and conclusions contained herein are those of the
authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily rep-
resenting the official policies or endorsements, either ex-
pressed or implied, of DARPA or the U.S. Government.
References
[1] M. J. Atallah and K. B. Frikken. Securely outsourc-
ing linear algebra computations. In Proceedings
of the ACM Symposium on Information, Computer
and Communications Security (ASIACCS), 2010.
[2] Y. Aumann. Security Against Covert Adversaries:
Efficient Protocols for Realistic Adversaries. Jour-
nal of Cryptology, 18(3):554–343, 2010.
[3] J. Brickell and V. Shmatikov. Privacy-preserving
graph algorithms in the semi-honest model. In Pro-
ceedings of the international conference on Theory
and Application of Cryptology and Information Se-
curity, 2005.
[4] H. Carter, C. Amrutkar, I. Dacosta, and P. Traynor.
For your phone only: custom protocols for effi-
cient secure function evaluation on mobile devices.
Journal of Security and Communication Networks
(SCN), To appear 2013.
[5] H. Carter, B. Mood, P. Traynor, and K. Butler.
Secure Outsourced Garbled Circuit Evaluation for
Mobile Devices. In Proceedings of the USENIX Se-
curity Symposium, 2013.
[6] comScore. comScore Reports February 2013 U.S.
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A Experiment Results
In Table 4 we provide full experimental timings for all
three of the evaluated test circuits with 95% confidence
intervals. For all Hamming Distance and Matrix Multi-
plication circuits, the execution times are averaged over
10 trials. For RSA-256, we ran 3 executions.
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Timing (Seconds) Reduction Over
Circuit WW CMTB KSS CMTB KSS
Hamming (1600) 95.57 ± 0.48 453.36 ± 2.32 2614.04 ± 7.08 78.92% 96.34%
Hamming (16384) 941.15 ± 11.07 1,335.75 ± 3.69 x 29.54% x
Matrix (3x3) 12.04 ± 0.26 493.28 ± 2.90 x 97.56% x
Matrix (5x5) 35.62 ± 1.01 543.67 ± 4.23 x 93.45% x
Matrix (8x8) 108.54 ± 3.55 702.13 ± 6.14 x 84.54% x
Matrix (16x16) 620.34 ± 13.83 2,263.86 ± 108.27 x 72.60% x
RSA-256 30,872.58 ± 1,148.69 x x x x
Table 4: Execution time (in seconds) for all tested circuits. Results with an ‘x’ indicate that a protocol was not able to
evaluate that circuit.
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